The first
day of the Somme, bloodiest day in British military history, commenced a
mere 53 years after another watershed battle, the bloodiest in the history of
the United States. July seems to attract cataclysms.
In the summer of 1863, Robert E. Lee was taking the
war into the North. Up until June of that year, nothing significant had
happened in the East above the Mason-Dixon line. Lee wanted to change that for
a number of reasons.
For one, all the slogging around Virginia was wreaking havoc on
vital agriculture. He hoped that a swoop through Pennsylvania might give the
Old Dominion a rest. At the same time, in the time-honored custom of armies
everywhere, he expected to pick up a few things to keep the Army of Northern
Virginia going. (There was a shoe factory in nearby Chambersburg, for example.)
Finally, he hoped to convince Northern pols that fighting to keep
the South in the union wasn’t an economically or politically viable
proposition. Invading Harrisburg or even Philadelphia would give a lot of
people pause to think.
And from his experiences with the Army of the Potomac and its
various commanders, he reckoned he had a reasonable chance of making that
happen.
Well, except he was operating under a couple of handicaps: his
most gifted general, Thomas J. Jackson (known as Stonewall from his performance
at the first
battle of Manassas), had died of wounds inflicted by his own troops at
Chancellorsville in May. Lee had considered Jackson his right arm and it
was a grievous loss.
The second drawback was that his cavalry commander, J.E.B. Stuart
(James Ewell Brown, if you’re asking) had basically disappeared up his own
behind. One of the main functions of cavalry was to gather intelligence about
the enemy’s movements. After making big splashes in the Peninsula and Maryland
campaigns of 1862 by dashing around the Army of the Potomac, he separated his
unit from Lee’s main force in late June, leaving Lee with no reliable data on
the Army of the Potomac’s whereabouts.
Lee found them, under the command of George G. Meade (of whom it
might be said that at least he wasn’t Joe Hooker. Or George B. McClellan. Or
Ambrose Burnside), at Gettysburg, a small town with a theological seminary and interesting
topography, on 1 July.
The two armies maneuvered some and fought for three days
in July heat that you cannot imagine unless you’ve experienced it. Thanks to
the actions of cavalry Brigadier General John Buford at the first meeting,
Union forces held the high ground, but it can’t have felt like much of an
advantage to those who were there.
To a certain extent fighting blindly (Stuart showed up on 2 July,
but didn’t have much in the way of intel to share), Lee issued
uncharacteristically ambiguous orders to Lt. General James Longstreet on the 2nd, and then
sent Maj. General George Pickett’s division up Cemetery Ridge on the 3rd,
resulting in utter carnage.
(In Ken Burns’ seminal documentary, The Civil War, historian Shelby
Foote made a comment on Pickett’s charge that has stuck with me. It was something
to the effect that, if he’d been a soldier given the order to cross that open
space and run up the hill in the face of massed Yankee fire, he’d
have said, “Lieutenant—I don’t think so.” That comment came back to me when I
stood at Colleville-sur-Mer and looked down from the cliff onto Omaha
Beach. I don’t know how either the Georgians or the GIs of the 29th Infantry Division took those steps.)
After three days of this, the armies faced each other in heavy
rain on the 4th; then Lee withdrew. Meade did not pursue. The Union
held the ground, but the Army of Northern Virginia (what was left of it) was
able to return to Virginia and regroup.
Up until then, Lee had believed in the invincibility of his
army—he’d asked it to do impossible things so many times, and it had. Not this
time. At Gettysburg, he was heard to repeat, “It is all my fault.”
Combined with the surrender on 4 July of Vicksburg to U.S. Grant
(breaking the lines of communication for the Confederacy in the West),
Gettysburg basically was the point at which it became clear that the North was
never going to quit, and the South was never going to win.
But the war would continue for another 22 months, with Grant
taking command of the Army of the Potomac steadily grinding down Lee’s armies,
and Sherman implementing the concept of total war through Georgia and the
Carolinas.
Gettysburg was the tipping point, 153 years ago today.
1 comment:
One would have thought that someone as steeped as I am in writings about the Civil War in general and Gettysburg in particular would not be moved by any new writing, but you have done it, as you so often do about any and all topics. Thank you.
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